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Abstract
Crew Resource Management (CRM) was introduced within the aviation industry
in the late 1970s after an aircraft ran out of fuel whilst the pilots were trying to
solve an undercarriage problem. To reduce such errors and ultimately lower the
probability of failure and the severity of risks that occur, training in CRM was
rolled out across the whole industry. It has been successful over the last few
years in major reductions in the number of crashes and fatalities in the
commercial aviation sector. Nursing has similar concerns in that errors can
ultimately result in fatalities [1]. There are parallels in the needs and expectations
of pilots and nurses to assess risk, reduce risk and deliver reliable and
dependable professional services. In this paper the parallels of pilots and nurses
demands are compared to assess if the lessons learned in aviation can assist
nurses deliver procedures with lower risks. The analysis will draw on the
demands and expectations and how they both deal with risk, challenging errors
and ensuring that identified risks are not overlooked or ignored [2]. Finally,
suggestions of adopting, sharing and benchmarking between these two industries
can adopt best practices so that both industries can learn from each other.
Keywords: Crew Resource Management, nursing, error reduction.

1 Introduction
The aviation industry has an extensive history of errors, mishaps, accidents and
disasters that stretch back before the first powered flight by the Wright Brothers
in 1903. These have been on small scale up to the world’s highest fatality in the
Tenerife disaster of 1977 when 583 people died in one accident. This disaster
occurred due to human error when one pilot made the decision that the fog
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bound runway was clear for take-off whilst not knowing that Air Traffic Control
had given permission to taxi on the runway. The result was a collision at speed
when one B-747 accelerating down the runway hit another B-747 taxing. The
subsequent investigation highlighted several errors and mistakes that had
happened, with the primary reason being human error and confusion.

Figure 1: Simulated image of impact between the two B-747s.
Aviation has many examples of things gone wrong and the advantage of this
industry is that it has systems in place to learn by its mistakes [3]. This Tenerife
incident brought about a quantum shift in the training of pilots, air traffic
controllers and personal involved with the safe operations of flight.
Below in figure 2 it shows the number of hull (total) loses from the 1940s
until present day. This clearly shows the increases that occurred up until the
1970s, when there has been a steady trend downwards. Given that this represents
the industry as a whole there needs to be a clear explanation of what this graphs
shows and does not show [4]. Accidents occur for a variety of reasons, with the
most prominent ones being: human error, mechanical and weather conditions.
The increase in commercial aviation increased post World War II and that also
increased the probability of accidents pro rata up to the 1970s. Passenger
numbers have increased almost exponentially since the 1980s; however, the
accident rate per flying hour has reduced over this period. It is statistically true to
say that flying is now safer than any time before. The exact reasons are complex
and one single action can claim its success [5]. Design theory is better,
computers to simulate and maintenance practices that are robust and
internationally accepted all assist in the reduction of accident. The principal
reason of any crash is still human error, whether a mistake, not accommodating
for weather conditions or lack of training or knowledge. The Tenerife accident
ignited the governing bodies around the world to identify deficiencies in training
and this started the subject of Crew Resource Management (CRM). It can be
argued this was the seminal moment when the aviation industry realised that
substantial responsibility was required to ensure the likelihood of any accident
was always at its minimum.
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Figure 2:
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Number of fatalities from airliners (14+ passengers) hull loss
accidents per year. In red is the 5-year average.

Figure 3 it shows the trend of accidents, reported per 100,000 hours of flying.
This trend is represented alike in both Europe, North America. Regardless of
what are the reasons why there is a reduction it is continuing to make aviation
the safest form of transport [6]. It is worth noting that the percentage of
categories assigned to the cause of an accident have not significantly changed in
the past 50 years, only the number of incidences. It will be argued by many that
CRM is a significant influence on this continuing improvement.

Figure 3:

Accident rates per 100,000 flying hours.
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Reasons for accidents apart from runway hazards can all be related to CRM
and the ineffective use of communications. The International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO) in 1944 at the Chicago convention designated that English
will be the universal language for aviation. Thus, any international flights must
use English for communication between Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) and other
communication links. Therefore, the majority of pilots flying outside of their
home county will be using English as a second language. Using that point half of
the reasons listed in Table 1 will involve a translation into a second language.
Table 1:

Percentage breakdown of principal reasons attributable to aviation
accidents.
Reason for Accident
Pilot deviated from basic operational
procedures
Inadequate cross-check by second crew
member
Design faults
Maintenance and inspection deficiencies
Absence of approach guidance
Captain ignored crew inputs
Air traffic control failures or errors
Improper crew response during abnormal
conditions
Insufficient or incorrect weather information
Runways hazards
Air traffic control/crew communication
deficiencies
Improper decision to land

%
33%
26%
13%
12%
10%
10%
9%
9%
8%
7%
6%
6%

CRM is a concept of operation and how people work together (Diehl [1]). Its
concepts are based on cognitive and interpersonal skills needed to manage
resources in an organisation, between organisations and between people. The key
word is communication. Communication between all involved in a flight and
effective ways of maintaining a professional standing is the fundamental focus
[7]. For example, telling someone does not mean they understand the task given.
There may be a variety of reasons why it was not understood: language, clarify
of description, inflection in the voice, etc.
Assumptions are made by those that give information and those that receive
information. In figure 4 below it shows how items may be identified, look
closely at B and 13. When the letter B is read in conjunction with other letters it
may be very easy to identify, when read in conjunction with numbers there are
concerns. Of course dyslexia, colour blindness and if any visual impairments can
result in errors, likewise audible clarity cannot easily be determined in crash
investigations if English is not spoken clearly. This is compounded when the
strength of radio communication is affected by background electronic noise, etc.
WIT Transactions on Information and Communication Technologies, Vol 47, © 2014 WIT Press
www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3517 (on-line)

Risk Analysis IX

Figure 4:
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Ways items can be identified.

Human factors in CRM has developed a method known as the SHEL model.
This is a method where the human is seen as the middle interface [8]. It can be
helpful to use a model to aid in the understanding of human factors, or as a
framework around which human factors issues can be structured. A model,
which is often used is the SHEL model, a name derived from the initial letters of
its components:
 Software (e.g. maintenance procedures, maintenance manuals, checklist
layout, etc.)
 Hardware (e.g. tools, test equipment, the physical structure of aircraft, design
of flight decks, positioning and operating sense of controls and instruments,
etc.)
 Environment (e.g. physical environment such as conditions in the hangar,
conditions on the line, etc. and work environment such as work patterns,
management structures, public perception of the industry, etc.)
 Liveware (e.g. the person or people at the centre of the model, including
maintenance engineers, supervisors, planners, managers, etc.)
 Human factors concentrates on the interfaces between the human (the ‘L’ in
the centre box) and the other elements of the SHEL model, and (from a safety
viewpoint) where these elements can be deficient, e.g.:
S: Misinterpretation of procedures, badly written manuals, poorly
designed checklists, untested or difficult to use computer software
H: Not enough tools, inappropriate equipment, poor aircraft design for
maintainability
E: Uncomfortable workplace, inadequate hangar space, extreme
temperatures, excessive noise, poor lighting
L: Relationships with other people, shortage of manpower, lack of
supervision, lack of support from managers.
Man – the ‘Liveware’ – can perform a wide range of activities.
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Figure 5: The SHELL model for interfacing with systems.
Affective CRM is meant to be there for all instances, but perhaps the most
critical is when there is a difference in experiences. A junior co-pilot flying
alongside an experienced Captain might feel intimidated to say if something is
not right for fear of being wrong, rebuffed or over-crossing a professional line.
This can be compounded when dealing with military and their ranks or in
cultures where age is seen as experience and to challenge is disrespectful [9].
Such situations can occur in nursing, a junior nurse dealing with an experienced
ward manager or in an operating theatre with a senior consultant are examples.

2 Nursing practices
Nursing no longer has the historical image of ladies helping keep wards clean
and making beds before handing out the medicine. It has evolved extensively
since the 1990s to be a degree based discipline that specialises with high tech
equipment and interfacing with many different medical disciplines [10]. Theatre
nursing, midwifery and intensive care nursing often involve dealing with senior
medical doctors and surgeons. Likewise, they have a hierarchy where junior or
newly qualified staff is under the same peer pressures as pilots and aircraft
maintainers. Peer pressure, the possibility of identifying errors under the fear of
embarrassment is a risk in nursing equal to those of the aviation industry. There
are many incidences where injury and death have resulted from mistakes not
being identified and others failing to comment due to peer pressures at work
[11]. There are parallels with the aviation industry that can be used as
benchmarking for reducing the likelihood of mistakes to patients and the patent
care process.
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Anesthetic care was studied for mishaps, errors and mistakes and this
extensive study produced the following classifications listed below. In such an
environment where time is critical, pressure of failure and dealing with relatives,
etc, add major input concerns that compound to result in potential disasters.
Below in the table shows the result from one such study [12]. This list is
representative of errors experienced in the aviation maintenance sector (Current
Anaesthesia and Critical Care, 1995 [22]). Human error accounts for the
principal reasons for a problem. Nursing that covers 24 hours a day for 365 days
in a year can be paralleled with aviation maintenance and pilots/ATC work
patterns. It cannot be over emphasised the parallels that compare between these
two different but allied worlds of pressure and expectations. Each of these
failures apart for the 10th and 12th have been a cause many aircraft accidents [13].
If proven and effective ways are readily available in other sectors then it is
difficult to argue against minimising risks by employing them in the hospital
environment.
Table 2: Classifications for aesthetic errors.
Failure
Misjudgement
Failure to check equipment
Fault of technique
Other human factors problems
Other equipment problem
Inattention
Haste
Inexperience
Communication problem
Inadequate preoperative assessment
Monitor problem
Inadequate preoperative preparation

Percentage
16
13
13
13
13
12
12
11
9
7
6
4

Medication errors have been shown to be as high as 11% of patient incidents,
(National Reporting and Learning System, 2012 [20]) in England and Wales
between June 2010 and June 2011. Although, approximately 90% of the 100,000
plus incidents that were reported caused no noticeable harm to patients, 253
resulted in problems that required further emergency medical intervention and
over 50 deaths. Such medication errors are most likely to be attributable to the
wrong dose, omitted or delayed medication or the wrong medication (National
Patient Safety Agency, 2009 [20]). There is no established method universally
adopted for minimising risk in medication errors. A computer based recording
and monitoring system cannot mitigate the effects from pressure, shift work and
tiredness. Within aviation there are limits in time worked as to when procedures
can be informed, for example, limiting the time a pilot can fly or be on standby.
This subject, above all else, is where human factors and training for the ‘dirty
dozen’ (the most common classifications of errors, mishaps and mistakes) could
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be argued to have the biggest impact in reducing the risk of errors in
administering drugs. Each year in aviation every maintainer must undertake a
training course in human factors, similar to CPR or child protection training. If
not completed and the assessment passed they are prevented from working on
any aircraft. Evidence has paralleled its introduction and reduction in errors,
mishaps and mistakes [14].
The most frequently cited wrong-dose error results from a calculation error. A
major drive by the NHS has been to remove these by trying different approaches.
In figure 6 below is one such attempt. Will wearing such a top stop errors,
remove people interrupting? It is as if stating speed limit signs will slow drivers
speed. A system approach of CRM is needed to make inroads into this problem
and minimise risk [15]. Effective drug administration must be managed in a
system approach and continuous training is at the very core of reducing risks.
CRM is more than training, it is equipping people with the skills, ability and
confidence to undertake a job function professionally and deal with extreme
situations that may not have been covered in training. Furthermore there are
individual techniques that are discussed below to assist in detail risk evaluation
and error removal. No one technique or procedure will ever remove risk; several
in series will collectively conflate the efforts to result in very low probabilities of
errors [16]. If the SHELL model is applied to this process and think of the
middle as the nurse, the S (software) will be the electronic recording,
H (Hardware) the container, recording method, E (environment) lighting level,
and finally L (Liveware) those other professionals sharing the task. All have to
be effective for the success, but each person can recognise if any mishap, error or
omission.

Figure 6: Drug error reduction procedure.
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There are numerous parallels between the aviation and nursing sectors.
Clearly there are lessons that can be learned and applied to integrate human
factors into the nursing profession. It could be to implement human factor
training and yearly follow ups as required for other techniques, e.g., lifesaving.
However, we need to evaluate risk. More specifically, reducing risk of an error
occurring. Here the suggestion is the Swiss Cheese Method.
The principle behind this model can be considered in reverse. For a hazard to
result in an error occurring the individual stages that contribute must align, for
example, the medication dose is unclear, pressure to administer, distractions
when calculation dosage [17]. When these all happen then the wrong dosage will
be delivered. This method is to review each stage that can go wrong, add
individual procedures to minimise and do the same for each stage. Thus,
collectively the likelihood reduces for a total system failure.
This model can be applied to drug rounds [18, 19]. The staff trained and
records kept, yearly up dates, sufficient time, and correct information coupled
with all associated equipment to administer, record and document. Each one is a
barrier, collectively they are a more robust barrier to minimise risk. These
methods add to those of conventional risk analysis, as Failure Mode Effects
Analysis (FMEA), which will evaluate the probability of a risk. Here, CRM is
not interested in the actual probability of a failure but that procedures will add
layer after layer to reduce the possibility [20]. The ultimate probability of any
failure will be linked to the probability of the severity, the occurrence and
detection. If not severe and unlikely to occur it could be argued the detection
system can be basic [21]. Alternatively, if moderate in severity and a common
occurrence then a robust detection system is needed. Balancing systems is more
detailed than just reviewing the severity of a problem.

Figure 7:

A representation of the principal approach. Only when all the risks
occur will the end result be a failure, omission, mishap or disaster.
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3 Conclusions
This paper has addressed the need and development of human factors in the
aviation industry and how Crew Resource Management has evolved for Pilots,
Air Traffic Controllers and maintainers. These techniques can be exploited
within the nursing and medical industry where numerous parallels can be drawn.
These parallels of peer pressure, life pressures, life and death situations where
problems can occur that are unique and require expert intervention. If we want to
reduce risks in nursing there is no need to invent new solutions, we can use the
tried and trusted methods that has served the aviation well during the last three
decades.
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